This month: two Kansas City Chiefs stars fight over whether a steakhouse lawsuit belongs in New York, 7-Eleven accuses Nike of copying its convenience-store stripes onto a sneaker, the TTAB reminds a mobile carrier that a lapsed registration buys you nothing in a later filing, and the first wave of musicians follows Taylor Swift’s lead in trademarking their own voices against AI clones.
1587 Sneakers v. Kelce and Mahomes: a venue fight before the merits
1587 Sneakers Inc. sued Kansas City Chiefs stars Travis Kelce and Patrick Mahomes in the Southern District of New York in February, alleging that 1587 Prime, the steakhouse the athletes co-founded with restaurant group Noble 33, infringes the sneaker brand’s rights in the number “1587.” The number carries a different meaning for each side. 1587 Sneakers built its brand around the year Filipino sailors first arrived in what is now the United States. For Kelce and Mahomes, 1587 combines their jersey numbers, 15 and 87.
1587 Sneakers says it began selling shoes and apparel under the name in April 2023, more than two years before the steakhouse opened in September 2025. But timing cuts against the sneaker company in a different way: Kelce and Mahomes filed a federal trademark application for 1587 Prime in December 2023, and the USPTO registered it in early February 2026, shortly before suit was filed. 1587 Sneakers did not file its own federal application until October 2025, and that application remains under USPTO review. A federal judge denied 1587 Sneakers’ request for emergency injunctive relief in March, citing the company’s delay in bringing the dispute.
The case resurfaced in the press this month, coinciding with Kelce’s wedding, but the live dispute is procedural rather than substantive. Kelce and Mahomes have moved to dismiss on personal jurisdiction and venue grounds, arguing neither athlete has sufficient ties to New York, the restaurant operates out of Missouri, and the dispute belongs in a Kansas City court. 1587 Sneakers points to the athletes’ national advertising and commercial reach to argue New York has a sufficient basis to keep the case. No ruling has issued on the motion.
For trademark counsel, this is a good reminder that venue and personal jurisdiction issues should be carefully considered up front, and your confusion arguments don’t matter if the case gets dismissed or transferred before the court ever reaches them. In light of the athletes’ limited direct contacts with New York, this motion looks positioned well, and the sneaker company may have to address its claims in Chiefs Kingdom.
7-Eleven v. Nike: Free Slurpee Day gets a lawsuit
On July 3, 7-Eleven filed a federal trademark infringement suit against Nike in the Northern District of Texas. The complaint targets Nike’s upcoming Air Max 95 “Big Bubble” sneaker in a sport-green and safety-orange colorway, which 7-Eleven says copies its registered Tri-Color Mark, the orange, green, and red stripe combination it has used commercially since at least 1987.
The timing is central to the complaint. Nike scheduled the shoe’s release for July 11, a date 7-Eleven says is widely recognized as “7-Eleven Day” and “Free Slurpee Day.” 7-Eleven alleges it repeatedly contacted Nike before filing suit and that Nike indicated it would proceed with the launch regardless. The complaint also cites unsolicited media coverage describing the Tri-Color Mark as instantly recognizable and iconic, along with headlines linking the sneaker directly to the retailer, as evidence of actual association in the marketplace.
7-Eleven has pleaded seven counts, including federal trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, federal trademark dilution, and four related claims under Texas common law and statute. The company seeks a permanent injunction and has demanded a jury trial.
For brand owners, this case illustrates how a color combination, standing alone, can support a registered mark and a viable dilution claim, particularly where the owner can show decades of exclusive commercial use and a body of unsolicited press treating the colors as a source identifier. Importantly, the alleged launch-date timing may be interpreted as a deliberate release date tied to a competitor’s brand event as evidence of intent, which bears on both the infringement and dilution analysis.
TTAB: In re TextNow and the cost of a lapsed registration
On June 23, the TTAB issued a precedential decision affirming refusal of TextNow Inc.’s application to register TOUCH MOBILE for cellular phones and related goods. The case is an illustration of what happens when a Section 8 filing deadline is missed.
TextNow, a Canadian company, had previously obtained a U.S. registration for the identical mark based on its Canadian registration, without ever claiming U.S. use. That earlier registration was cancelled after TextNow missed its deadline to file a Declaration of Use or Excusable Nonuse. While the original registration was still on the books, but after TextNow had already missed its filing deadline, a third party registered MOBILE TOUCH for legally identical services. When TextNow reapplied for TOUCH MOBILE, the examining attorney refused registration based on a likelihood of confusion with that intervening registration.
TextNow argued that its prior registration should be treated as controlling, or at least persuasive, on the confusion question. The Board rejected that argument directly: “there is no rule that a prior registration entitles [an applicant] to another registration.” TextNow also argued the cited MOBILE TOUCH mark was conceptually weak, but with no evidence of commercial weakness in the record and no claim of acquired distinctiveness by the cited registrant, the Board gave that mark its normal scope of protection. Because TOUCH MOBILE is essentially a transposition of MOBILE TOUCH, covering overlapping services and presumed to travel through the same trade channels, confusion was likely.
Taken together, this decision is a direct warning about the risk of docketing gaps around Section 8 deadlines. A missed deadline does not just cost the registration at issue. It can open a window for a competing mark to register, and that competing registration can then block a client’s own re-filing years later. For any portfolio with foreign-based registrations relying on Section 44 or Section 66(a), a reliable use-declaration calendar is not administrative housekeeping. It is a substantive part of protecting the mark.
Celebrities keep trademarking their voices against AI
Last month, we covered Taylor Swift’s April filings for sound marks capturing her voice, alongside a still-pending First Amendment fight over THE LIFE OF A SHOWGIRL. That April filing is turning out to be the start of a trend rather than an isolated tactic. Lionel Richie filed four trademark applications on June 11 covering recordings of his voice saying phrases tied to his public identity. The Backstreet Boys followed on June 24 with a sound mark application covering the group saying, “Hi, we’re the Backstreet Boys.” Both filings follow the same playbook used earlier this year by Matthew McConaughey, Jimmy Kimmel, and UK broadcaster Jeremy Clarkson.
The strategy responds to a real gap. State right-of-publicity laws vary widely in scope and typically only provide a remedy after unauthorized use has already happened. Trademark law, by contrast, is built around preventing consumer confusion before it occurs, which is why performers are reaching for it against AI voice cloning and deepfakes. A registered sound mark tied to a distinctive, source-identifying phrase gives the owner a federal cause of action and a Lanham Act likelihood-of-confusion framework to work with, rather than relying solely on state law that may or may not apply depending on where the infringing use occurs. This remains an untested legal theory. Sound marks have always required a showing of distinctiveness and a genuine tie to a commercial source, not just fame. A phrase or vocal snippet that functions more like a personal catchphrase than a source identifier for specific goods or services could face genericness or failure-to-function objections down the road, and no court has yet ruled on whether an AI-generated voice clone that mimics a registered sound mark actually infringes it. As such, practitioners should watch for the first enforcement action under one of these marks. That case, whenever it comes, will tell us whether this approach holds up or simply adds a registration certificate to a right-of-publicity claim that was already available.
